Dec 3, 2003 3 min read

After reading a recent guest commentary by Brian Lutes, I decided to write in response to just one part of it so as not to wear out my writing hand. Upon agreeing to go to China, the general discovered what was a near impossible situation, if not impossible. Let’s consider that at this date in history we have 60 years hindsight – usually always 20/20. Not so at that time. Gen. George C. Marshall was dealing with quite a cast of characters in China. The nationals in power, led by Chang, were at that time pretty much despised by much of the people throughout the provinces due to the ruthless and corrupt practices of many of the local officials – not Chang himself, but government representatives none the less.

Mr. Marshall extracted vow upon vow from Chang that he would rein the corruption in and end it – each vow went unfilled. I don’t judge Chang here, as perhaps he could not really accomplish it. I really don’t know, but either way the corruption went on unchecked. Add to this the fact that Chang continually refused for whatever reason to heed the advice of how to have his troops adequately oppose Mao’s troops.

Mao (the communist leader) sent his representative at times to negotiate and each time left him hang out to dry and refused to honor whatever had been agreed upon. Now remember that at this time, so soon after WWII, neither the American people nor Congress had any stomach for a war in China.

Marshall’s private correspondences showed that he came to a couple conclusions about China:

– If the nationals did not end the corruption and mistreatment throughout the provinces, the Chinese nationals were doomed to lose power regardless of how much treasure we supplied to prop up Chang. The republican controlled houses in Washington were not anxious to continue the flow of treasure to China – perhaps the Democrats would not have been either had they controlled the houses. But either way, Marshall came to believe it was a lost cause without the proper reforms by the nationals in any case.

– He came to believe that the only other way to hold off Mao was a prolonged war using our troops – totally impossible at that time due to American public opinion, the mood of Congress, the draw-down of our manpower after the war, and a host of other considerations at the time.

One can begin to see the weight of the problems.

Now anyone can disagree with Mr. Marshall, but to take the gigantic leap from disagreement to calling the man a communist sympathizer is truly sad. As for the noted books that were cited to support this view, I too am familiar with them, and one must always consider the bias of the authors, since we all – if we have an opinion, are by definition biased in one way or another.

Senators McCarthy and Jenner would be proud of the recent guest commentary, as it was nearly identical to many of their embellished speeches.

As an after thought, if Marshall sold them out why did Gen. Lisimo Chang Kai Check remain a devoted friend and admirer of Marshall till the end of his life.

Mike Daniels

Hopwood